Mr. President, I rise today in order to update my

colleagues in this body on the recent activities of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence with respect to Iraq. This is a subject that

has been in the headlines consistently for many different reasons. But

my purpose in rising today is to report to the Senate, for it is an

important day in that the Intelligence Committee members, as of this

afternoon, will be presented the working draft of what the staff has

been working on for better than 7 months.

In June of last year, nearly 8 months ago, the Intelligence Committee

began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into the existence of Iraq's

weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups,

Saddam Hussein's threat to regional stability and security in the

Persian Gulf, and his violation--obvious violation--of human rights.

This review was initiated as part of the committee's continuing

oversight of the U.S. intelligence community's activities and programs,

which is always continuing. Our committee staff had, for the previous

several months, already been examining the intelligence activities

regarding Iraq, including the intelligence community's support to the

United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq and the community's analysis

and collection of reporting related to the alleged Niger-Iraq uranium

deal.

On June 20, 2003, however, Vice Chairman Rockefeller and I issued a

press statement. We announced a joint commitment to continue the

committee's thorough review of prewar U.S. intelligence. In that press

statement, Senator Rockefeller and I agreed to examine the following:

the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on the Iraqi regime's

weapons of mass destruction programs, its ties to terrorist groups, the

regime's threat to stability and security in the region, and its

repression of its own people.

We also agreed to look at the objectivity and the reasonableness,

independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence

Community; whether those judgments were properly disseminated to

policymakers in the executive branch and the Congress; whether--and

this is very important--any influence was brought to bear on anyone to

shape their analysis to support policy objectives; finally, other

issues we might mutually identify in the course of the committee's

review.

I laid out three phases of the committee's overall Iraq review.

First, to evaluate the quantity and quality of the intelligence

underlying prewar assessments concerning Iraq; second, to determine

whether the analytical judgments contained in those assessments were

objective, independent, and reasonable; third, to evaluate the accuracy

of those assessments by comparing them with the results of the ongoing

investigative efforts in Iraq.

This afternoon, as I have stated, our committee members will begin

reading and reviewing the staff's draft report, which does contain the

committee's efforts to complete the first and second phases of the

review. The third and final phase will be completed when the Iraq

survey group completes its work in Iraq.

Mr. President, I fully agree with the distinguished

chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and I am very proud to serve

on that committee, as well as privileged being the chairman of the

Intelligence Committee.

We discussed this at great length. All members of these committees

discussed it at great length. We have a responsibility to the American

people to

fully investigate this and to publicly, when we can, when we are not

dealing with any classified information, tell the American people what

they should know and have a right to know. We are proceeding in that

fashion. We are taking this very seriously, which is why I am trying to

summarize now for the Senate and for all those who may be interested in

this issue precisely what we have done to date in regard to the

Intelligence Committee.

The Senator is exactly right, he has taken the lead in the Armed

Services Committee with the appropriate people within the military, and

I thank him for his contribution.

Mr. President, our review in the Intelligence Committee

began in earnest in early June of last year when the intelligence

community did provide our committee with 19 volumes--19 volumes, floor

to ceiling--and they contained approximately 15,000 pages of

intelligence assessments and sources and source reporting underlying

the assessments of the Hussein regime's WMD programs. They also

pertained to ties to terrorist groups, the threat to stability and

security in the region, as I have said before, and the repression of

his own people.

Our committee staff began immediately to read and analyze every

report provided to determine how intelligence analysts reached their

conclusions and whether any assessments were not supported by the

intelligence provided to the committee.

Our committee staff endeavored to the greatest extent possible to

disregard--to disregard--postwar revelations concerning Iraq in order

to replicate the same analytical environment enjoyed by the

intelligence community analysts prior to the war.

In late August and early September of 2003, our committee staff did

request additional intelligence to substantiate the intelligence

community's assessments which staff judged were not sufficiently

supported by the intelligence that had been previously provided. Not

only did we ask for the original information, but when we were not

satisfied, we asked for more; we demanded more.

Our committee staff began to receive this additional supporting

intelligence in October of 2003. In late October, the staff requested

any intelligence which had not already been provided that contradicted

the intelligence community's prewar analysis in regard to Iraq.

For example, the committee staff requested intelligence that showed

Iraq had not reconstituted its nuclear program, had not renewed the

production of chemical agents, and had abandoned an offensive

biological weapons program. In early November of 2003, the intelligence

community wrote to the committee that it was working to provide the

contradictory intelligence we requested.

In the same letter, the community stated it had uncovered an

additional six volumes of intelligence material that supported its

assessments on Iraq's WMD programs, and the community did provide the

contradictory intelligence information in late November.

I want my colleagues to realize that this has been an extremely

thorough undertaking. During the 8 months of the committee's review,

our committee staff submitted almost 100 requests for supplemental

intelligence information, received over 30,000 pages of documents in

response to those requests, and reviewed and analyzed each document

that was provided.

Additionally, our committee staff have interviewed more than 200

individuals, including intelligence analysts, senior officials within

the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,

Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State,

National Ground Intelligence Center, the Air Force, and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

They have also questioned former intelligence analysts, national

intelligence officers, operations officers, collection managers,

signals intelligence collectors, imagery analysts, nuclear experts with

the International Atomic Energy Agency, ambassadors, former United

Nations inspectors, Department of Defense weapons experts, State

Department officials, and staff members of the National Security

Council.

Additionally, the committee has held three hearings on aspects of

United States intelligence on Iraq, a hearing on the Iraq-Niger

connection, a briefing by the CIA and State Department inspectors

general on their review of the Iraq-Niger issue, and a hearing on the

history and the continuity of weapons of mass destruction assessments

that pertain to Iraq.

These efforts have enabled our committee staff to develop a full

understanding of the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting

supporting the intelligence community's prewar assessments.

Our committee staff have also gained an understanding of how

intelligence analysts throughout the community used that intelligence

to develop their assessments on these issues and how those assessments

were actually disseminated to policymakers, and whether those

assessments were reasonable, objective, independent, or if there was

any political consideration and, again, whether any influence was

brought to bear to shape their analysis to support any policy

objective.

The professional bipartisan staff of the Intelligence Committee I

think has done an outstanding job. It is a very complete job. For the

next 3 weeks, however, it will be the members of the committee, our

turn to do our work by reading and reviewing and suggesting any changes

to the report.

I only hope that members will not prejudge the report. Let me repeat

that. I only hope that members will not prejudge the report--there has

been activity in the past indicating plans to do just that; I hope that

does not happen--and that they will take the time to actually read the

information in order to make informed critiques of the material.

This report can have a profound impact--it will have a profound

impact--on the future of our intelligence community as we face the

threats of a new century. However, this can only be done if colleagues

on both sides of the aisle put aside election year politics and review

the facts in an objective and unbiased manner.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. President, I wish to read a statement by Winston

Churchill which I think has application to the inquiry we are

conducting in the Intelligence Committee and the whole issue in regard

to the credibility and the timeliness of intelligence prior to the war

in Iraq. Sir Winston Churchill said this upon hearing about the attack

on Pearl Harbor:

Let me repeat that.

Let me repeat that.

Referring to Americans.

I am concerned in what appears to be almost a blast furnace of

politics at a very early time, in an even-numbered year--and I

understand that. I know politics is not bean bagged, and I know that my

colleagues have very serious differences of opinion, as we will on the

committee, but I hope what Sir Winston said: ``Some said they were

soft, others that they would never be united . . . their system of

government and democracy would paralyze their war effort,'' is not true

in regard to the global war on terrorism. I have some concerns about

that.

I indicated at the first, when I knew it was our responsibility and

obligation, in working with the distinguished vice chairman of the

Intelligence Committee, that we would do our job and that we would do

it just as bipartisan as we possibly could, that it would be

thorough. It is my view that this draft report, and then what the

Members will agree to, will be the most thorough review of the

intelligence community in the last decade. I also said that we will

make every effort to hold public hearings, because the American people

have a right to know, and we will let any political chips fall any way

they want to fall.

I yield the floor.